Reference analysis compiled from public sources. It is not updated automatically, so figures are as of the date shown and may be out of date. Pages marked live use automatically refreshed data.
A tracker for US chip export controls, entity list designations, drone component restrictions, arms embargoes, and investment bans shaping the global AI weapons race.
Four escalating rounds of semiconductor restrictions have progressively cut off China's access to high-end AI compute — reshaping global military AI development and NVIDIA's balance sheet.
Companies on the BIS Entity List, OFAC SDN List, NS-CMIC List, and other restriction regimes involved in AI weapons development. Export license requirements apply; licenses are generally denied.
Export restrictions on dual-use drone technology — from Wassenaar-controlled inertial sensors to ITAR-restricted electro-optical systems. The component layer is where most enforcement happens.
| Component | Control Regime | Classification | Notes | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Inertial Measurement Units (IMU) | EAR / ITAR / WA | ECCN 7A003 | High-precision IMUs (accuracy <10 deg/hr) require export license. Used in autonomous navigation and GPS-denied operations. Widely found in recovered Iranian Shahed drones. | Restricted |
| FLIR / Electro-Optical Sensors | ITAR / EAR | USML Cat XII | Thermal imaging sensors for target acquisition. Full ITAR control for military-grade. Dual-use commercial sensors in EAR. Critical for autonomous targeting and ISR payloads. | ITAR Controlled |
| Military-grade GPS Modules | EAR / ITAR | ECCN 7A994 / USML XIV | Encrypted GPS/GNSS receivers for precision navigation. Commercial GPS freely exported; military-grade encrypted units controlled. Adversaries use Russian GLONASS and Chinese BeiDou alternatives. | Restricted |
| Flight Controllers (mil-spec) | EAR | ECCN 7D003 | Autopilot systems capable of autonomous flight profiles. Open-source platforms (ArduPilot, PX4) widely used by adversaries. Military-hardened versions with anti-jam and autonomous engagement modes restricted. | Restricted |
| AI Inference Chips (Edge) | EAR | ECCN 3A090 | Nvidia Jetson, Qualcomm SDC, and similar edge AI processors used for onboard target recognition. Subject to same performance threshold controls as data center GPUs when intended for military use. | Restricted |
| Turbine Engines (MALE class) | ITAR / MTCR Cat I | USML IV | Gas turbine engines powering long-range armed drones. Full ITAR control. Major bottleneck for adversary MALE drone programs — forces use of less capable piston engines or acquisition from Russia/China. | ITAR Controlled |
| Satellite Communication Modems | EAR / ITAR | ECCN 5A001 | SATCOM terminals enabling beyond-line-of-sight drone control. Critical for MALE/HALE drone operations. Starlink terminals have been found on Ukrainian and Russian front-line drones — highlighting commercial SATCOM control challenges. | Restricted |
| Electronic Warfare Payloads | ITAR | USML XI | Jamming, spoofing, and SIGINT systems for drone-mounted EW. Full ITAR control. Russia and China develop independently; Iran acquires via IRGC procurement networks using third-country front companies. | ITAR Controlled |
| Commercial Drone Components (DJI) | FCC / DoD | NDAA Sec. 848 | DJI drones banned from US federal procurement under NDAA. Commercial sale in US continues. Both Ukraine and Russia use DJI Mavics for frontline reconnaissance — DJI refused to limit geofencing in conflict zones, later reversed under pressure. | DoD Banned |
Multilateral and unilateral arms embargoes targeting AI weapons recipients. Effectiveness varies enormously — UN embargoes with no enforcement mechanism typically fail; targeted financial sanctions have greater impact.
Beyond export controls, the US has moved to block capital flows into Chinese military AI through executive orders and CFIUS — recognizing that foreign investment accelerates adversary capabilities.
| Company | Restriction Type | Basis | Compliance Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| SenseTime | NS-CMIC / EO 14105 | Military AI, Xinjiang surveillance | US investors divested; HK-listed. No new US investment permitted. |
| Megvii | NS-CMIC / EO 14105 | Military AI, Xinjiang surveillance | Canceled NYSE IPO. Private company. US investors exited positions. |
| CASIA (CASIA AI) | EO 14105 | Military AI research institute link | Under review. US LP exposure in China funds being assessed. |
| CloudWalk | Entity List / EO 14105 | Xinjiang surveillance AI | Listed on Shanghai STAR Market. No actionable US investment pathway. |
| Hikvision | NS-CMIC / EO 14105 | Military surveillance AI | US institutional investors required to divest under NS-CMIC rules. Ongoing compliance enforcement. |
A practical reference for defense industry professionals navigating the ITAR/EAR framework. Violations carry severe criminal and civil penalties. When in doubt, seek qualified export counsel before proceeding.